

1 Marty Harper (#003416)  
2 [mharper@polsinelli.com](mailto:mharper@polsinelli.com)  
3 Andrew S. Jacob (#22516)  
4 [ajacob@polsinelli.com](mailto:ajacob@polsinelli.com)  
5 Jennifer Axel (#023883)  
6 [jaxel@polsinelli.com](mailto:jaxel@polsinelli.com)  
7 POLSINELLI P.C.  
8 CityScape  
9 One East Washington St., Suite 1200  
10 Phoenix, AZ 85004  
11 Fax: (602) 264-7033  
12 Phone: (602) 650-2000  
13 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

12 Don Addington; et al.,  
13 Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

15 US Airline Pilots Ass'n, et al.,  
16 Defendants.

No. CV-13-00471-PHX-ROS

**OPPOSITION TO US AIRWAYS'  
MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 28)**

**Oral Argument Requested**

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18 Plaintiffs oppose US Airways' Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 28.] US Airways must be a  
19 party in this action because it is a defendant to a valid contract claim that can only be  
20 decided by a federal court. Plaintiffs explain their opposition further in the *Memorandum*  
21 *of Points and Authorities* that follows.

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. Overview**

3 **A. The 2005 Merger of America West and US Airways**

4 In 2005, US Airways (then a bankruptcy debtor) and America West Airlines  
5 merged to form a new airline also called US Airways, one of the defendants in this  
6 action. [Complaint, Doc. 1, at ¶ 1.] In furtherance of that merger, the pilots (“East Pilots”  
7 from US Airways and “West Pilots” from America West) and the airlines entered into an  
8 agreement called the “Transition Agreement.” [*Id.*, at ¶¶ 2, 42.] The Transition  
9 Agreement provided that the pilots would combine their seniority lists and that they  
10 would negotiate a “Single Agreement” with the new airline that would use such  
11 combined seniority list to fully integrate pilot operations. [*Id.*, at ¶ 103.] The pilots  
12 subsequently created that combined seniority list in an arbitration proceeding. [*Id.*, at  
13 ¶ 3.] The list that came out of that proceeding is known as the “Nicolau Award.” [*Id.*]

14 The Transition Agreement provided (and both pilot groups so understood) that the  
15 Nicolau Award would be a “final and binding” combination of the two pilot seniority  
16 lists. [*Id.* at ¶ 45.] Yet, the East Pilots immediately repudiated that agreement. [*Id.*, at  
17 ¶ 4.] Details of their repudiation are set out in the pending motion for a preliminary  
18 injunction. [Doc. 13, at 4:15 to 6:6 (internal pagination).]

19 **B. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation**

20 At the core of their repudiation of the Nicolau Award, East Pilots created US  
21 Airline Pilots Association (“USAPA”), a single-airline union that is controlled by the  
22 East Pilot majority. [Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 5, 7.] In a representation election, USAPA ousted the  
23 Airline Pilots Association, the multi-airline union then representing these pilots and  
24 requiring implementation of the Nicolau Award. [*Id.*, at ¶¶ 6, 58-62.] Under East Pilot  
25 control, USAPA is firmly and unequivocally repudiating its duty to honor the Nicolau  
26 Award.<sup>1</sup> [*Id.*, ¶ 84.] Indeed, as this Court noted in the previous case before it between the

27 <sup>1</sup> The Court found that “USAPA is bound by the Transition Agreement.” *See US*  
28 *Airways, Inc. v. Addington, et al.*, CV-10-01570-PHX-ROS, Doc. 193 at pg. 6:19-20.

1 parties “the main purpose of USAPA is to reject the Nicolau Award.” *See US Airways,*  
2 *Inc. v. Addington, et al.*, CV-10-01570-PHX-ROS, Doc. 193 at pg. 3:23-24.

### 3 **C. First Round of Litigation**

4 In September 2008, Plaintiffs filed a duty of fair representation (“DFR”) claim  
5 against USAPA along with contract claims against US Airways. *Addington v. US Airline*  
6 *Pilots Ass’n.*, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (D. Ariz. 2008). Plaintiffs sought damages against  
7 US Airways for lost wages and benefits and sought to enjoin US Airways from  
8 furloughing West Pilots that had a higher position than East Pilots on the Nicolau Award  
9 list. *Id.* at 1058. Judge Wake held that these contract claims (but not the DFR claim)  
10 were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the System Board because they involved the  
11 “interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements.” *Id.* at 1063. The Court  
12 dismissed those claims (against the airline) because none of the exceptions to that  
13 exclusive jurisdiction applied (but as explained below do apply here now). *Id.* at 1063-64.  
14 Later, the Court entered judgment against USAPA on the DFR claim that was later  
15 vacated for lack of ripeness. *Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n.*, 606 F.3d 1174, 1184  
16 (9th Cir. 2010).

### 17 **D. Second Round of Litigation**

18 On July 27, 2010, US Airways filed a second round of litigation, a declaratory  
19 action that sought a ruling as to whether the airline would be liable if it entered into a  
20 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with USAPA that did not implement the  
21 Nicolau Award. *US Airways, Inc. v. Addington*, No. 10-CV-01570-ROS (D. Ariz. Jul. 26,  
22 2010). The Court held that USAPA would breach its DFR if it entered into such a CBA  
23 without “a legitimate union purpose.” [Amend. Judgment, 1 (Dec. 4, 2012) (Doc. 206)].  
24 It left open the question of whether USAPA, under some as yet unforeseen  
25 circumstances, could have such a purpose.

### 26 **E. Third (and present) Round of Litigation**

27 The Transition Agreement has an implied covenant that “requires that neither party  
28 will engage in any act that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the

1 other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” *Loc. 3-7, Int’l Woodworkers v. Daw*  
2 *Forest Prods. Co.*, 833 F.2d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
3 The “fruits of the contract” at issue here is implementation of the Nicolau Award. The  
4 Transition Agreement provided that the implementation of the Nicolau Award would  
5 occur when the pilots and the new airline entered into a single agreement applicable to  
6 both East and West Pilots (referred to in the Transition Agreement as the “Single  
7 Agreement”) that provided one set of wages and benefits for all pilots, East and West.  
8 [*Id.*, at ¶ 103.] The Transition Agreement also required that US Airways accept the  
9 integrated list that arose out of the procedures outlined in the Transition Agreement,  
10 which resulted in the Nicolau Award. [*Id.*, at ¶ 107.] On December 20, 2007, US  
11 Airways accepted the Nicolau Award pursuant to the terms of the Transition Agreement.  
12 [*Id.*, at ¶ 55.] The implied covenant in the Transition Agreement, therefore, constrained  
13 US Airways from entering into any agreement with its pilots that set their wages and  
14 benefits unless it also provided for the integration of US Airways pilot operations using  
15 the Nicolau Award list. [*Id.*, at ¶¶ 104-07].

16 In February 2013, US Airways and USAPA entered into a contract, the  
17 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Contingent Collective Bargaining Agreement  
18 (“MOU”). [*Id.*, ¶ 78.] A copy of the MOU has been filed in this action. [Doc. 5-2.]<sup>2</sup>  
19 Alleviating any doubt that the MOU is the Single Agreement contemplated by the  
20 Transition Agreement, it is described as an “agreement” that “provided for, among other  
21 things, the terms and conditions of employment for the pilots of American and US  
22 Airways during the period of single operations following a merger.” *See In re AMR*  
23 *Corp.*, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, AMR Disclosure

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24 <sup>2</sup> Documents to which a complaint refers, even when not attached, are considered to be  
25 part of the pleadings and may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to  
26 dismiss. *F.D.I.C. v. Frankel*, 2011 WL 5975262 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing *Branch v.*  
27 *Tunnell*, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), *overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v.*  
28 *Cnty. of Santa Clara*, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). Because US Airways has  
attacked the Court’s jurisdiction, it not restricted to the face of the pleadings but can  
review any evidence to resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction. *See, e.g.*  
*McCarthy v. United States*, 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988).

1 Statement, Doc. 7632, § III(D)(4) at pg. 47. It, therefore, is the “Single Agreement”  
2 contemplated in the Transition Agreement. [*Id.*, at ¶ 105.]

3 But, in derogation of the implied covenant in the Transition Agreement, the MOU  
4 does not provide for the integration of pilot operations using the Nicolau Award list. [*Id.*,  
5 at ¶ 82.] To the contrary, it provides that the only way to modify the “seniority lists  
6 currently in effect at US Airways” is through the McCaskill-Bond process outlined in  
7 paragraph 10 of the MOU. [Doc. 5-2 at § 10(h)]. The current seniority lists in effect at  
8 US Airways is not the Nicolau Award, but rather the two separate lists of East and West  
9 Pilots from pre-merger US Airways and American West Airlines. [*Id.* at § 15]. USAPA  
10 and US Airways have repudiated the Nicolau Award as part of the MOU, in violation of  
11 the contractual obligations under the Transition Agreement and in violation of USAPA’s  
12 duty of fair representation.

13 The MOU unequivocally denies the West Pilots the “fruits” of the Transition  
14 Agreement—a path to implementation of the Nicolau Award. The MOU, therefore, either  
15 breached or changed the Transition Agreement. If the MOU breached the Transition  
16 Agreement, Plaintiffs have a valid contract claim against US Airways that can only be  
17 adjudicated by this Court rather than the Systems Board. In the alternative, if the MOU  
18 changed the Transition Agreement, Plaintiffs have a valid claim that US Airways acted in  
19 concert with USAPA to breach the DFR.<sup>3</sup> Either theory supports a valid claim against US  
20 Airways and entitles the West Pilots, at long last, to be integrated with the East Pilots  
21 pursuant to the Nicolau Award.<sup>4</sup>

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22  
23 <sup>3</sup> “Acting in concert” in such manner provides an alternative basis for subject matter  
24 jurisdiction based on these facts. *See* § II.B., *infra*. If needed, Plaintiffs can amend their  
25 pleadings to state such cause of action directly.

26 <sup>4</sup> To the extent that USAPA, US Airways, or others, argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to  
27 interfere with US Airways pending merger with American Airlines, enjoin USAPA from  
28 going forward with the MOU or “force” USAPA to breach any terms of the MOU, these  
arguments are more legal contrivances created by USAPA to prevent integration with the  
West Pilots pursuant to the Nicolau. Plaintiffs’ position has been clear since the  
beginning of this dispute in 2008: the only list that US Airways, USAPA and the East  
Pilots can use for purposes of any agreement that sets the terms and conditions of  
employment of the US Airways pilots is the Nicolau Award. It is Plaintiffs’ contention

1 **II. Legal Argument**

2 **A. Overview**

3 US Airways equates the contract claim in this action with the claims that the West  
4 Pilots made in 2008. That is wrong. In 2008, the West Pilots claimed that US Airways  
5 was breaching an existing contract. They sought damages against US Airways and an  
6 order enjoining US Airways from furloughing West Pilots. Because such relief could be  
7 granted without jurisdiction over USAPA it was subject to administrative resolution.

8 Now, Plaintiffs claim that US Airways wrongfully entered into a contract (the  
9 MOU) along with USAPA. This was wrongful because it breached an existing obligation  
10 to implement the Nicolau Award seniority order. Plaintiffs seek an order directing US  
11 Airways and USAPA to use the Nicolau Award seniority order when merging pilot  
12 seniority with the American Airlines pilots pursuant to the MOU. Such relief can only be  
13 obtained from a federal court. This Court, therefore, now has jurisdiction that was lacking  
14 in 2008.

15 **B. Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims that an airline and its union**  
16 **made an agreement that violates workers' rights.**

17 In minor disputes, the Board of Adjustment provides an exclusive administrative  
18 remedy. *Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n*, 491 U.S. 299, 310 (1989). An  
19 exception to that rule is made where a union wrongfully acts “in concert” with the  
20 carrier-employer to breach an existing CBA or to set up “schemes and contrivances” to  
21 stymie aggrieved employees. *Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co.*, 393 U.S. 324, 331 (1969).  
22 Rather, in such matters, “[j]oinder of the employer is permissible” in the court  
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25 that the MOU did set the terms and conditions of employment for the US Airways Pilots.  
26 If the Court ultimately agrees that this dispute is now ripe and orders USAPA and US  
27 Airways to use the Nicolau Award for purposes of the MOU, compliance with such an  
28 order does not require interference with or delay of the MOU or merger process.  
Whether USAPA will choose, *at some point in the future*, to attempt to interfere or halt  
the MOU process because of such an order is not something that should be a  
consideration of this Court (or any other) for purposes of Plaintiffs' action.



1 proceedings against the union. *Raus v. Bhd. Ry. Carmen of the U.S. and Can.*, 663 F.2d  
2 791, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1981).

3 The sine qua non of a carrier-employer acting in concert with a union to deny  
4 workers' rights is where the carrier-employer and the union enter into an agreement that,  
5 on its face, violates the union's DFR. Indeed, the first decision to recognize the existence  
6 of the DFR established that courts have jurisdiction in such matters over the carrier-  
7 employer. *Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

8 More recently and directly on point, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary  
9 injunction directed at an airline (and its pilot union) to remedy a tainted CBA that  
10 abrogated a minority pilot group's right to fair seniority integration after an airline  
11 merger. *Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Assn., Intl.*, 873 F.2d 213, 218 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The  
12 district court acted within its discretion in issuing an order to set the tainted agreement  
13 aside, compel the parties [the union and the airline] to reach a new one . . ."). The MOU  
14 here, because it fails to implement the Nicolau Award seniority order, is similarly tainted.  
15 This Court, therefore, has similar jurisdiction to provide a remedy directed at both US  
16 Airways and USAPA.

17 The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of jurisdiction over a carrier-  
18 employer in *Glover*, 393 U.S. 324. The workers in that matter sought relief against both  
19 their union and the carrier-employer. *Id.* at 328. The Supreme Court found that there was  
20 jurisdiction, distinguishing a claim alleging that a CBA was wrongful on its face from a  
21 claim alleging that it was wrongfully applied. *Id.* at 328-29 (holding that "the jurisdiction  
22 of the Railroad Adjustment Board remains exclusive in a fair representation case, to the  
23 extent that relief is sought against the railroad for alleged discriminatory performance of  
24 an agreement validly entered into and lawful in its terms"). In other words, where the  
25 carrier-employer and the union enter into a wrongful agreement, "the employer is made a  
26 party to insure complete and meaningful relief." *Id.* at 329. "The federal courts [in such  
27 matters] may therefore properly exercise jurisdiction over both the union and the  
28 railroad." *Id.* (citing *Steele* as an example).

1           *Glover* applies where a carrier-employer and union reach an agreement that is  
2 wrongful on its face. An agreement that derogates existing seniority rights for no  
3 legitimate union purpose is wrongful on its face. To provide a meaningful remedy where  
4 a union and carrier-employer have made such an agreement, a court must have  
5 jurisdiction to order both parties (the employer and the union) to change the terms of the  
6 agreement. That is precisely what happened in *Bernard*. That is what should happen here.

7           As the Court cautioned in the second round of litigation, “US Airways must  
8 evaluate any proposal by USAPA with some care to ensure that it is reasonable and  
9 supported by a legitimate union purpose.” *See* CV-10-01570-PHX-ROS, Doc. 193.  
10 Here, there was no legitimate union purpose for USAPA to abandon the Nicolau Award  
11 other than to attempt to negotiate a more favorable outcome for the East Pilots at the  
12 expense of the West Pilots. US Airways was without doubt aware that there was no  
13 legitimate union purpose to abandon the Nicolau Award, yet agreed to do so.

14           **C. This Court has jurisdiction to order US Airways (and USAPA) to use the**  
15           **seniority order in the Nicolau Award list.**

16           The claim against US Airways here is not (as it was in 2008) that the airline is  
17 misapplying the Transition Agreement. The claim is that US Airways entered into an  
18 agreement that sets “the terms and conditions of employment for the pilots of American  
19 and US Airways” (the MOU) that violates the implied covenant in the Transition  
20 Agreement (and violates USAPA’s DFR). The injunction sought here would order US  
21 Airways and USAPA to use the Nicolau Award for seniority integration in the course of  
22 the American Airlines merger. [Doc. 1, ¶ 123.] To provide such a remedy, this Court  
23 must have jurisdiction over both US Airways and USAPA. This Court, therefore, must  
24 deny US Airways’ motion.

25           **D. US Airways’ willingness to arbitrate does not negate this Court’s**  
26           **jurisdiction.**

27           US Airways submits a declaration by Allen Hemenway, establishing that US  
28 Airways is willing to submit to the dispute resolution procedures set out in the Transition

1 Agreement (the so-called “Board of Adjustment”). [Doc. 28-1, at ¶ 4.] That willingness,  
2 however, is immaterial because the Board of Adjustment is incapable of providing the  
3 requisite relief.

4 It is well-established that administrative procedures such as the Board of  
5 Adjustment need not be exhausted where the plaintiff seeks “a remedy not available  
6 through the grievance procedure.” *Beriault v. Loc. 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of Int’l*  
7 *Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union*, 501 F.2d 258, 266 (9th Cir. 1974). As  
8 explained above, where the wrong at issue occurred at the level of contract formation, a  
9 forum such as the Board of Adjustment does not have the authority to right the wrong.  
10 *Croston v. Burlington N. R.R.*, 999 F.2d 381, 386 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[a]n  
11 employee will be excused from exhausting administrative remedies . . . where the alleged  
12 breach of duty relates to the union’s conduct in negotiating the collective bargaining  
13 agreement.”).

14 The remedy for the DFR / contract breach / acting-in-concert claim here would be  
15 an order compelling US Airways and USAPA to use the Nicolau Award seniority order  
16 when implementing the MOU to create a combined seniority list with the American  
17 Airlines pilots. Such an order must apply to both the airline and the union.

18 The Board cannot provide such relief unless USAPA agrees to submit its DFR  
19 liability to the Board. USAPA expresses no willingness to do so. Moreover, even if  
20 USAPA did express such willingness, there is no basis to compel Plaintiffs to do so.  
21 *Steele*, 323 U.S. at 207 (“the right . . . to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the  
22 bargaining representative to represent and act for the members of a craft, is of judicial  
23 cognizance.”). US Airways’ willingness to arbitrate, therefore, is insufficient to deprive  
24 this Court of jurisdiction.

### 25 **III. Conclusion**

26 Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to deny US Airways’ motion to dismiss for lack  
27 of subject matter jurisdiction.  
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Dated this 26th day of April, 2013.

**POLSINELLI PC**

By /s/ Andrew S. Jacob  
Marty Harper  
Andrew S. Jacob  
Jennifer Axel  
*Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of April 2013, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the U.S. District Court Clerk's Office by using the ECF System for filing and transmittal.

By /s/ Andrew S. Jacob