

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

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US AIRWAYS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

-against-

11-CV-371 (RJC)(DCK)

DECLARATION

US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION and
MICHAEL J. CLEARY,

Defendants.
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MICHAEL J. CLEARY, declares as follows under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746:

1. I am currently a Captain and have been employed by US Airways as a Pilot since February 3, 1986.

2. I am the President of the USAirline Pilots Association (hereinafter referred to as "USAPA" or "the Union") and have been since April 18, 2009 through to date. From April 18, 2008 until April 18, 2009, I served as Vice President of USAPA. My duties and responsibilities in these capacities include but are not limited to: functioning as the chief executive officer of USAPA, charged with establishing and accomplishing the goals and objectives of the organization, managing the internal USAPA Committee structure including the Negotiating Advisory Committee, Merger Committee, Grievance Committee and all others; planning all meetings of the Board of Pilot Representatives ("BPR") (USAPA's governing body) including construction of the agenda, conducting the meetings themselves in accordance with Robert's Rules of Order, and managing the political process to gain consensus and develop a work plan for the implementation of the governing body's decisions; maintaining constant contact with the BPR when they are not in session to manage their input and needs from a variety of

representational aspects, including management of visits of individual pilots to the Chief Pilot's office for disciplinary matters and contract enforcement.

3. I am a former member of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA"). When ALPA was the certified bargaining representative of the US Airways Pilots, I served in the following positions of responsibility within the US Airways ALPA Master Executive Council ("MEC"): Grievance Committee Vice Chairman; Chairman of the System Board of Adjustment, Member of the System Board of Adjustment; Committee Member on the Merger Committee; Committee Member on the Strategic Planning Committee; Committee Member on the Scope Clause Review Committee; and First Officer and Captain Representative.

4. On May 19, 2005, US Airways announced the intent to merge with America West Airlines (hereinafter "America West"), an airline based in Phoenix, Arizona, and the merged airline became US Airways. The process of integrating the employee groups from the two airlines began after the merger. As part of this merger, the corporate management for America West assumed control of the newly-created corporation, which maintained the US Airways name. Thereafter, USAPA became the certified bargaining representative for the Airline Pilots employed by the merged entity.

5. Prior to the America West merger, the relationship between US Airways management and the pilots' union (then ALPA) with respect to safety was collegial, harmonious and productive. Management would constantly communicate with the union and individual pilots to ensure that all of their safety practices, SOPs and guidelines were safe. The prior management also included the union in the process of changing or revising practices, SOPs and guidelines before said change or revision was actually implemented.

6. Put simply, prior to the America West merger in September 2005, an effective

and pragmatic safety culture existed at US Airways. That safety culture stood in stark contrast to the culture that existed at America West prior to the merger. America West management, who are now US Airways management, has a long history of safety violations dating back to the 1990s when they had so many safety violations that the FAA threatened to ground the fleet and threatened to bar them from acquiring additional aircraft. That same philosophy exists today and is the root of the problem.

7. Shortly after the merger was completed and the America West management team took over at US Airways, it became clear to the pilots that safety was no longer a primary concern at US Airways but that safety had taken a subordinate position to costs and to a relentless pressure for on time performance at the expense of safety. The degradation of US Airways' safety culture became clear over time.

8. In response to our increasing concern about safety at US Airways, in May 2008 USAPA appointed Thomas Kubik as the new Chairman of USAPA's Safety Committee. Captain Kubik was uniquely qualified for the position.

9. From 1978 until 1985 Captain Kubik was employed by US Airways as a First Officer. After being promoted to Captain, he spent four years as a regular line pilot and in 1989 was promoted to the position of Check Airman in the training department. He worked as a Check Airman from 1989 - 2006. A Check Airman is a pilot who trains other pilots employed by US Airways regarding, among other things, all applicable rules, standard operating procedures ("SOPs"), and safety requirements established by US Airways and the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). In order to keep US Airways in compliance with applicable rules and standards, a Check Airman evaluates and trains pilots using a flight simulator and by observing actual flight operations. In December of 2006, Captain Kubik moved to Charlotte and

returned to a position as a line pilot. He has been recognized as a "designee" by the FAA or an individual who may qualify other pilots to operate aircraft.

10. In his capacity as the Chairman of the USAPA Safety Committee, Captain Kubik works at my direction and that of the Board of Pilot Representatives. His duties include responding to the safety concerns of US Airways pilots, informing the pilots with respect to safe operations, representing the union on various safety boards mandated by the FAA, and dealing with the company on safety issues including USAPA's positions on safe practices, SOPs and other guidelines that US Airways has implemented unilaterally and that are outdated or inconsistent with the safe operation of the aircraft.

11. Beginning in or around May 2008, when Captain Kubik became the new Chairman of USAPA's Safety Committee, USAPA renewed its effort to restore a proper safety culture at the airline. The first order of business was an attempt to gain a seat for USAPA at the Flight Operations Safety Board (hereinafter "FOSB") so that the line pilots who are intimately familiar with and who are experts on the aircraft in US Airways' fleet as well as in the rules, regulations and operating procedures that affect them and the safety of the airline's operations could be privy to discussions regarding changes to SOPs and other guidelines, could present anecdotal evidence to the FOSB with respect to certain safety issues, and could propose changes and revisions to SOPs and other guidelines as a result of actual experience in the cockpit.

12. The Carrier denied USAPA's request to include a USAPA representative on the FOSB.

13. Both the law and regulations place responsibility for the operation of the aircraft squarely and finally in the hands of the Captain of a flight. In particular, the applicable regulations provide that the pilot in command of an aircraft "is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft" and "[i]n an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, . . . may deviate from

any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.” U.S. FAA FAR 91.3. As a result of this responsibility, the FAA requires the Captains to participate in many programs designed to assure the safe operation of the aircraft.

14. In late spring 2010, Captain Kubik attended a conference in San Diego sponsored by the FAA. At the conference, he heard a report by Dr. Terry L. von Thaden, a professor at the University of Illinois, regarding the measurement of the safety culture of various airlines. Given USAPA’s grave concerns regarding the safety culture at US Airways, and particularly the pressures exerted by management having put economic concerns to the forefront, Captain Kubik was convinced that the company could benefit from such a survey.

15. In late-summer of 2010, Captain Kubik and Captain John Sabel met with Captains Lyle Hogg and Bob Skinner, US Airways’ Vice President of Flight Operations and Managing Director of Training respectively, and asked them to have the company commission a safety survey. Captain Kubik was hopeful that the company would cooperate in such a survey particularly since the company had commissioned Dr. von Thaden to do a similar survey in the past when it was known as America West. Dr. von Thaden is a well-known expert in the field. She has performed over 220 similar surveys and has been commissioned to do surveys by both the United States Air Force and the FAA. Despite her impressive credentials, and the fact that the company had used her in the past for a similar project, the company refused to commission Dr. von Thaden for a survey.

16. Captain Kubik then met with Dr. von Thaden and asked if the survey could be done without the company’s involvement. Although reluctant to undertake the project in the absence of the company’s participation, Dr. von Thaden agreed to perform the survey. The proposed survey was brought before the USAPA Board of Pilot Representatives and was

unanimously approved. USAPA also agreed to bear the full cost of the survey.

17. The survey commenced in the fall of 2010 and was completed by December.

According to Dr. von Thaden, the results of the survey indicated that “the safety culture at US Airways is generally negative and in need of intervention.” She identified twelve areas of particular concern;

- 1) The pressure for profitability had led to cutting corners and poor scheduling practices
- 2) Pilots felt pressed to push in areas where it would be better to slow down.
- 3) Personal safety and comfort of the pilots is not seen as a leadership concern.
- 4) Problems with pushing for on-time departure which may hinder safety.
- 5) Problems with accurate reporting through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS).
- 6) Certain Chief Pilots were not acting in the best safety interests of the Line Pilots.
- 7) Ground crews approaching the aircraft while under power.
- 8) Safety personnel were perceived as out-of-touch with the actual risks inherent in flight operations.
- 9) Unsatisfactory response to reported safety issues.
- 10) Inconsistent treatment along with perceptions of favoritism.
- 11) Perceived cultural misalignment of pilots from the West and pilots from the East.
- 12) Little pilot input on safety decisions or processes at US Airways.

Dr. von Thaden concluded the executive summary by stating: "These survey results represent the culture of safety at US Airways flight operations and should not be distorted by any party as biased or meeting political ends. Sharing this information and using it for positive change is necessary to reinforce trust, integrity, due diligence, and value in safety, and jointly increase consistency in the perception of the safety culture among company personnel."

18. In that spirit, I sought a meeting with company officials to share the results of the survey and to solicit their cooperation in jointly addressing the safety concerns identified in the survey. In January of 2011, Dr. von Thaden presented her findings at a meeting attended by Captains Kubic, Sabel, Hogg, Randal Mowrey (USAPA Vice President), Mr. Paul Morrell, the company's Vice President of Corporate Communications and myself. From the very beginning of this meeting, it was apparent that the company was not interested in discussing the survey and

its findings, and was more intent on seeking to discredit the findings. Shortly after the meeting, the company wrote USAPA and, instead of seeking common ground to address the issues in Dr. von Thaden's findings, simply took issue with the findings in an effort to rebut them.

19. Since that time, the company has engaged in a campaign to discredit the safety initiatives of the Union. This has included a campaign of harassment and intimidation of the pilots that has attempted to discredit the pilots as they seek to maintain the safe operation of the aircraft and to silence its Safety Committee Chairman, Captain Kubik.

20. In connection with his responsibilities as USAPA Safety Committee Chairman, and in that capacity, in or about April and May 2011, Captain Kubik published information to USAPA pilots to inform them of various measures to improve their working conditions and advance the safe operation of aircraft.

21. Said communications responded, in part, to the results of the comprehensive Safety Culture Survey, which, among other things, identified numerous areas of aircraft operation that were of concern to pilots due to the level of risk to safety involved.

22. The USAPA Safety Committee communicated its opinions concerning certain SOPs to pilots and proposed measures to ameliorate the risks posed by such SOPs to the safe operation of aircrafts.

23. As a direct result of the USAPA Safety Committee's expression of opinion and communications to USAPA membership concerning means of improving working conditions, by letter dated July 1, 2011, US Airways threatened to discipline Captain Kubik, who had acted solely in his capacity as USAPA Safety Committee Chairman, including seeking, or threatening, his termination from employment.

24. The threats made to Captain Kubik became known to the rank-and-file USAPA membership and have been, and continue to be, used by US Airways as an object lesson to other pilots who engage in protected speech and other lawful activities for the mutual aid and benefit of pilots to improve their working conditions, by, *inter alia*, making aircraft operations safer.

25. For many years prior to July 2011, and for various security related reasons, US Airways' employees, including pilots, have been required to display various forms of identification.

26. For many years prior to July 2011, US Airways has permitted its employees, in displaying their identification credentials, to wear a wide variety of lanyards, badge backers and other ID clips, including, but not limited to, those demonstrating support for a particular union or cause.

27. In or about April, 2011, USAPA distributed to its members lanyards that bear the legend "Safety First, I'm on Board".

28. Although the "Safety First" lanyards did not mention USAPA or contain any union insignia, due to USAPA's well publicized efforts to improve safety and the safe operation of aircraft (the safety culture survey paid for by USAPA being an example), these lanyards are generally associated with USAPA and are a recognized expression of support by its members for USAPA and its organizational goals, including the safety program.

29. On or about July 11, 2011, US Airways announced that commencing August 1, 2011, only company approved and uniform lanyards and other identification holders would be permitted.

30. US Airways cited the lack of professionalism and possibility of divisiveness among the workforce because lanyards and ID holders were used to promote “organizational agendas.”

31. US Airways did not explain the rationale for change the practice regarding the lanyards and ID holders.

32. However, the long established practice and custom was that employees remained free to use whatever lanyard they chose and the August 1 directive changed this longstanding practice.

33. Another respect in which US Airways is interfering with pilots’ statutory rights and violating the status quo is that pilots are being subjected to “investigatory interviews” with increasing frequency and with respect to matters for which US Airways has not previously required pilots to appear for in-person interviews, all as part of a campaign of harassment and intimidation of pilots for supporting USAPA’s safety initiatives.

34. For many years prior to approximately October 2010, it was the agreed practice through long-standing precedent and conduct that pilots would be subjected to investigatory interviews and required to report to Chief Pilots’ offices only in limited circumstances, and infrequently, if ever, related to matters within the operational judgment of pilots, including matters affecting safety and the airworthiness of aircrafts.

35. Since October 2010 and continuing to the present, US Airways has required pilots to attend investigatory interviews for matters relating to their operational decision-making, including pilots’ judgments concerning safe taxiing speeds, for addressing equipment malfunctions (e.g. cockpit door closing mechanism, safety equipment, oxygen pressure and other

similar issues) and for complying with the FARs in documenting these malfunctions in the FDMC.

36. On or about July 6, 2011, US Airways issued notices to 10 pilots requiring them to attend Chief Pilots' offices for investigatory interviews for alleged delayed/slowed taxiing, a matter of pilot discretion and judgment that has not previously been the basis for such interviews.

37. On or about July 15, 2011, defendants issued notices to 25 pilots who are being subjected to investigatory interviews with respect to similar operational decision-making.

38. A further manifestation of US Airways' attack on USAPA and its members for supporting USAPA's safety initiatives is US Airways' unprecedented discharge of pilots.

39. In 2011, as in prior years, US Airways required pilots to complete a distance learning program, which in a recent instance was supposed to be completed by May 31, 2011.

40. In 2011, as in prior years, some pilots were unable to complete the program for a variety of scheduling and other reasons.

41. In a sharp departure from its usual and customary policies and practices, in or about June and July 2011, US Airways discharged pilots for failing to complete the program. US Airways publicized these terminations in a communication to all other US Airways pilots. Never before has the company publicized any pilot discipline of any magnitude. When questioned by USAPA Grievance Committee Chairperson Captain Tracy Parrella as to why the company would change its practice of keeping discipline confidential, Captain Hogg responded that he wanted the termination to reverberate through the pilot ranks. These remarks by Captain Hogg demonstrate the retaliatory nature of the company's behavior.

42. In its brief in support of the motion for the Temporary Restraining Order, the company cites four instances which supposedly support its allegations that USAPA has engaged in an illegal campaign.

43. In the first instance, the company asserts that two placards were found in the flight deck maintenance log of an aircraft. I can state categorically that neither of the placards were produced nor countenanced by USAPA. Moreover, in neither instance were the contents of the placards evidence of an illegal slowdown. The placard that was purportedly found on August 4, 2011, merely urged the pilots to comply with their responsibilities. It is the duty of the pilot to enter discrepancies within the log so that maintenance can fix them. The company would have this court believe that the pilots taking seriously their responsibility to the passenger public and to themselves was evidence of an illegal act. Indeed, the Company's Flight Operations Manual (FOM), Section 8.3.5 FDML Discrepancy states, "An FDML discrepancy entry is required for any failure, malfunction or defect that may affect the safe operation of the aircraft" The logbook entries are required by both the FOM and the FARs; they are absolutely not subject to the discretion of any pilot or mechanic. Any insinuation to the contrary is a violation of law, is clearly not in the public interest and is emblematic of the flawed safety culture that exists at US Airways. Moreover, the placard allegedly found on August 5, 2011, urges pilots to maintain solidarity in the face of the unrelenting assault by the company on their rights guaranteed under the Railway Labor Act.

44. In the second instance, the company cites a series of e-mails supposedly written by a pilot urging a slowdown and other acts. USAPA categorically denies that it had anything to do with these e-mails. We have no idea who the writer of the e-mail is and are not aware if he is even a member of USAPA. As stated before, a significant portion of the membership would like

to see the union fail and it does not strain credulity to assume that false e-mails were engendered to provide "evidence" in this proceeding. Not only does the Union categorically deny that it had anything to do with those e-mails, it repudiates them. Even if one could establish that these e-mails were written by a member, which the company plainly has not, in the current era of instant communication there surely must be a higher standard of evidence than showing that one member out of nearly 4,000 has written an offensive e-mail. The writing of one person who has not even proved to be a member of this organization cannot possibly be considered evidence of any illegal intent by this organization.

45. In the third instance, the company cites a publication of this organization, "The Iron Compass," as some sort of evidence that the union is engaging in an illegal campaign. In a classic bootstrap argument, the company urges the court to find that because USAPA has defended this case that therefore the Union is somehow engaged in an illegal slowdown. Nothing could be further from the truth. This case has nothing to do with what the pilots have done, but instead has everything to do with what this union has said. As we have stated elsewhere in our papers, this action was started immediately after USAPA took out an ad in USA Today bringing our concerns about the culture of safety to the attention of the passenger public. The ad, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to this Declaration, describes what happened when, on June 16, 2011, a Captain with 30 years experience refused to allow her flight to depart for a trans-Atlantic night crossing because of a failed power component which, if it continued to fail, could have left the aircraft without electrical power over the Atlantic at night. Management pressured her to fly despite the problem and when she refused, had security escort her out of the airport in an unprecedented and deliberately humiliating action. The company then threatened to have the rest of the crew arrested if they did not cooperate. Five other pilots also refused, one-

by-one to fly the aircraft until the problem was finally fixed. It was determined that the power component was indeed faulty, the aircraft was removed from service, and, finally, repaired. Eventually a second crew flew the flight hours later and only after the component had been repaired. This one egregious example of the company's willingness to pursue profit and on time performance over safety and despite the judgment of experienced pilots who, under the applicable regulations, are charged with final and exclusive control over the aircraft. In short, this union stands by its assertion, as communicated to our pilots, that such actions are totally unacceptable, and it is obvious that the Company's continued threats and other coercive and intimidating tactics, and this lawsuit, are all aimed at stifling the legitimate and indeed mandatory judgment of pilots who are simply doing their duty by refusing to fly unsafe equipment and refusing to cut corners in pursuit of shorter taxis, quicker departures and company profits. The "Iron Compass" said this and nothing more.

46. The fourth instance the company cites is my letter to the pilots dated August 6, 2011. By way of background, the Union, as part of its effort to encourage safety, has provided lanyards to its members. Those lanyards carried the affirming and inoffensive message "Safety First, I'm on Board." For the first time in its history, the company banned the wearing of those lanyards and required the pilots to wear only company-issued lanyards. USAPA believes that this abrupt change in policy is again another instance of the company's campaign of intimidation and harassment for bringing legitimate safety concerns to the forefront. However, rather than urging our members to disobey company directives and engage in any illegal activity to protest what is clearly an abrogation of their free speech rights guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act, USAPA has urged its members to avoid conflict, do the responsible thing and obey the company directives, however misguided and illegal, and seek a determination of their rights in the

appropriate forum. I advised members that they “may absolutely be assured that very soon you will be provided numerous alternative methods of showing support for your union.” Since its inception, the Union has urged its members to show support and solidarity in numerous legal ways. They include informational picketing, wearing of union buttons, participating in the Union’s work and many other areas that are both legal, proper and protected by law. In no way can my urging the members to show support for the union be any evidence of illegal activity.

47. The Company has cited several email messages. One, which I will refer to by its colorful principal reference, is the “Pink Panties” message. The other two are purportedly authored by “Randy Johnson” and “Kevin Smith.” See Hemenway Declaration, Exs. 16, 18, 20. The sender of the first is not identified. No one named “Randy Johnson” or “Kevin Smith” is employed by or has any position of responsibility whatsoever with the Union. Neither these nor any of the other anonymous emails or random emails cited by the Company were authorized by or in any way solicited or instigated by the Union. Nor do any of these messages accurately describe the Union’s position in any way.

48. If, in fact, the company has been experiencing delays, those delays are likely the result of factors other than the USAPA’s safety initiative program.

49. For example, the company has purchased recently-introduced software that monitors ground delays and air traffic control. These programs actually slow down the aircraft or delay aircraft from leaving the gate.

50. In addition, the company’s flights are experiencing their highest load factors ever. This affects boarding time and makes early departures harder to obtain, therefore minimizing the likelihood of an early arrival. Compounding the effect of high load factors is the company’s decision to charge more for both first and second bags checked by passengers. As a result,

flights are accommodating more “carry on” luggage by passengers, more luggage is checked at the gate because of full overhead bins, and the time between the final passenger boarding and all doors being closed has increased. This delay is unavoidable because the flight attendants are holding to their contract which does not allow earlier boarding of special passengers or passengers otherwise requiring additional time to board.

51. Recent taxiway and runway construction at Charlotte Douglas International Airport is another source of flight delays. Beginning in winter 2010 and continuing through the spring 2011, the gate hold operations in Charlotte intentionally held aircraft at the gate before taking off to limit the number of aircraft taxiing at one time. Recent resurfacing of taxiways and runways also caused arrival and departure delays due to entrances being blocked and taxiing aircraft being diverted to longer detours before reaching gates or runways. Recent construction has also led to additional planes being parked throughout the day in areas that they previously were only parked in at night, requiring pilots to avoid these areas and, as a result, adding additional time for aircraft to get to or from the gates or exit/entrance spots. There was also a ground collision between an East AB330 and a West AB 320, and, as a result, the company has re-emphasized taxi cautions in order to guard against the lost time and aircraft damage the company has experienced over the last six to twelve months because of this collision and other problems.

52. Flight times are also affected by different ACARS programming features (ACARS functions to automatically record the time of certain aircraft movements, among other functions) . Currently, some Airbus airplanes are programmed to record a “blocking out” time when all doors closed versus when the doors are closed and the brake is released as in previous months. The manipulation of this recording device by the company may be an attempt to

accomplish more “apparent” on-time departures. Prior to this spring, pilots had written up many planes that were giving false “in times” because ACARS captured the last time the brake was set prior to getting to the gate if the cargo door was opened. Since then, the pilots have not set the brake when holding short of the runway to ensure correct block time when entering the gate. In addition, by working with the airport’s ramp workers’ bargaining representative to limit the dangers of opening the cargo door with engines running, block in time have increased over the last three to six months.

53. The lack of sufficient staffing for Airbus pilot positions, particularly FO’s at the Charlotte hub, has led to fewer pilots being available when delays occur and crews who fly every day must be deadheaded in and out of bases to cover trips. It’s obvious that the company is not maintaining sufficient staff from the fact that permanent base bid openings have been left unfilled due to inadequate pilot coverage.

54. Company data shows that the US Airways Express operation is proportionately experiencing more cancellations than US Airways mainline even though the Express pilots have a currently effective collective agreement and no outstanding labor dispute. Attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 are the figures and chart published by the Company. Express flies approximately twice the overall number flights flown by mainline but, as the Exhibits show has more than twice the number of cancellations. Express flies out of the same airports as mainline and experiences the same weather and other problems. The fact that Express experiences proportionately more cancellations strongly suggests, if not proves, that any cancellations at mainline are not the result of labor unrest but the result of other factors.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on August 12, 2011.

Dated: August 12, 2011
New York, New York



MICHAEL J. CLEARY

EXHIBIT #1

US AIRWAYS' UNWRITTEN POLICY:

Revenues First, Safety Second?

We know this is going to sound unbelievable, but please read on.

On June 16, 2011, a US Airways Captain with 30 years of experience stopped her flight from departing. Something was wrong with the airplane. She was deeply concerned about a balky power component that, should it continue to fail, might have eliminated all electrical power on her trans-Atlantic flight.

Despite her valid concerns, US Airways' management pressured her to fly the airplane, over the ocean, at night. When she refused to jeopardize the safety of her passengers, **US Airways' security escorted her out of the airport, and threatened to arrest her crew should they not cooperate.**

Before she was removed from the aircraft, two other US Airways pilots also refused to fly the aircraft. After she was removed from the airport, **three more US Airways pilots refused to fly the aircraft, citing their own concerns about the fitness of the plane.** It turned out the pilots were right: the power component was faulty and the plane was removed from service and, finally, fixed. Eventually a third crew operated the flight, hours later.

US Airways pressured six highly experienced pilots to ignore their safety concerns and fly passengers over the Atlantic Ocean at night in a plane that needed maintenance. Fortunately for all of us, these pilots stood strong and would not be intimidated.

Don't just take our word that this happened. Please research this yourself and learn the facts. Here's a starting point: www.USAirlinePilots.org/SafetyFirst. Once you review this shocking information, please keep in mind that while their use of Corporate Security to remove a pilot from the airport is a new procedure, the intimidation of flight crews is becoming commonplace at US Airways, with documented events occurring on a weekly basis.

The flying public deserves the highest levels of safety. US Airways wants to maximize their revenues by pushing their employees to move their airplanes regardless of the potential human cost. US Airways' pilots are committed to resist any practices that compromise your safety for economic gain. We've been trying to fix these problems behind the scenes for quite some time; now we need your help. Go to www.USAirlinePilots.org/SafetyFirst to get more information and find out what you can do.

**The 5,000 pilots of the US Airline Pilots Association
want you to know the facts.**



(Use your QR Reader app to get more information, or go to www.USAirlinePilots.org/SafetyFirst)

EXHIBIT #2

Date	Cancelled MTD	Cancelled PYMTD	Cancelled Express MTD	Cancelled Express PYMTD
10-Dec	865	1189	3096	3416
11-Jan	1797	1068	4920	2147
11-Feb	688	2371	2851	5820
11-Mar	261	519	1958	1633
11-Apr	430	315	2559	654
11-May	416	232	1912	976
11-Jun	581	261	2179	1270
11-Jul	624	424	2640	1908

EXHIBIT #3

Cancelled Month - Mainline vs. Express

