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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Don ADDINGTON; John BOSTIC; Mark BURMAN; Afshin IRANPOUR; Roger VELEZ; and Steve WARGOCKI,

Plaintiffs.

VS.

US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, US AIRWAYS, INC.,

Defendants,

Don ADDINGTON; John BOSTIC; Mark BURMAN; Afshin IRANPOUR; Roger VELEZ; and Steve WARGOCKI,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

Steven H. BRADFORD, Paul J. DIORIO, Robert A. FREAR, Mark. W. KING, Douglas L. MOWERY, and John A. STEPHAN,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:08-cv-1633-PHX-NVW (Consolidated)

DEFENDANT USAPA'S
NOTICE OF MOTION,
MOTION, AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
DUES RESTITUTION CLAIM

Case No. 2:08-cv-1728-PHX-NVW

NOTICE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant US Airline Pilots Association ("USAPA" or "Defendant" or "Movant"), by and through its attorneys, Seham, Seham, Meltz & Petersen, LLP, and Lubin & Enoch, P.C., requests that this Court issue an order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(c) dismissing plaintiffs' unpled claim for restitution of fees and dues paid to USAPA by the class.

MOTION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(c), USAPA hereby moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for restitution of fees and dues paid to USAPA by the class, which claim was asserted for the first time in this action in plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (Dkt. No. 120, at 2).

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

I. Factual Background

On December 29, 2008, nearly four months after this action was commenced, plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, in which they requested, for the first time in this case, an "Order directing restitution of fees and dues paid to USAPA by class." (Dkt. No. 120, at 2). Plaintiffs did not plead such a claim in their initial complaint or in their amended complaint, nor have they made any motion to amend their complaint in order to add this new claim.

The dues restitution claim was discussed in a telephonic hearing with the Court on February 20, 2009. During that conference, the Court informed counsel that "our own initial research which I don't pretend to be complete or exhaustive, fails to disclose any legal basis that would authorize a remedy of disgorgement of union dues in these circumstances." (Feb. 20 Tr. 5:14-17). The Court instructed plaintiffs' counsel "if you have got something, the time is going to come sooner rather than later which you are going to have to show me, because it doesn't, at least initially, doesn't appear there's any legal remedy in these circumstances for that." (Tr. 5:18-22).

At the end of the February 20, 2009 conference, the Court invited USAPA to file a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss plaintiffs' unpled dues restitution claim. But before the filing of such a motion to dismiss, the Court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to disclose the legal basis for their claim:

Before you file the motion, obviously, I don't want you to file a motion just to find out it's wrong. I would rather you dialogue with Mr. Stevens and find out what cards he's holding. And if he's got enough cards, then don't waste your clients' money or my time with the motion. We'll go forward.

(Tr. 28:23 – 29:3). Plaintiffs' counsel has failed to comply with the order to disclose "what cards he's holding," thus conceding that counsel is unable to satisfy the Rule 11 requirement to certify that the claim is "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

Further, plaintiffs have failed to file a motion to amend their complaint, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Even if plaintiffs were to file a motion to amend, it

should be denied due to plaintiffs' inexcusable delay. *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

By order dated March 13, 2009, the Court ordered "that Defendants may file a Rule 12(c) motion concerning the availability of union fees recovery or suspension by March 20, 2009." (Dkt. No. 253).

II. Legal Standard on Rule 12(c) Motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A Rule 12(c) judgment will be granted if the pleadings demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2008). In this case, USAPA submits that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiffs' unpled dues restitution claim.

III. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Pled a Claim for Dues Restitution.

Plaintiffs did not plead a claim for restitution of dues in their initial complaint or in their amended complaint, nor have they made any motion to amend their complaint in order to add this new claim. The Court has recognized that "it is unclear whether the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged recovery of dues and fees as a form of relief in their First Amended Complaint." (Dkt. No. 202, at 8:6-7; Dkt. No. 248, at 6:20-23).

Plaintiffs argue that their claim for dues restitution is somehow contained within the First Amended Complaint's boilerplate request for "such other relief that the Court deems necessary and proper." (Dkt. No. 214, at 13, fn. 5). However, this does not satisfy even the liberal pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires "a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of this rule is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); *see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (pleader is required to more than merely incant labels, conclusions, and the formulaic elements of a cause of action); *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2507 (2007); *Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005). Clearly, the request for "such other relief that the Court deems necessary and proper" in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint does not give USAPA "fair notice" (or any notice) of their claim for restitution of dues.

IV. Injunctive Relief is Not an Available Remedy for Plaintiffs' Dues Restitution Claim.

Plaintiffs have argued that they "seek dues disgorgement/forgiveness as part of the equitable remedy for USAPA's blatant violation of its duty of fair representation." (Dkt. No. 214, at 12:17-18). According to plaintiffs, they do not seek "true damages"; they seek only equitable relief. (Dkt. No. 214, at 12:18-22). Thus, as plaintiffs have characterized it, the equitable remedy that they seek with respect to their dues restitution claim is an injunction.

However, the Supreme Court has denied the very type of relief that the plaintiffs would seek had they moved to amend their complaint. In *International Association of Machinists v. Street*, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Supreme Court denied a request for an injunction restraining the enforcement of a union security agreement, which was sought

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by employees who objected to the use of union funds for political causes. The Supreme Court held that an injunction restraining enforcement of the union-shop agreement is not an appropriate remedy because "[r]estraining the collection of all funds from the [union] sweeps too broadly" and that such an injunction "might well interfere with the appellant unions' performance of those functions and duties which the Railway Labor Act places upon them to attain its goal of stability in the industry." *Id.* at 771.

Pursuant to *Street*, the plaintiffs are not entitled to restrain the collection of required union dues paid by West pilots because such a remedy is overbroad and would interfere with USAPA's performance of its functions and duties that are mandated under the Railway Labor Act.

V. Plaintiffs' Dues Restitution Claim Should be Dismissed Because There is No Legal Authority for Dues Restitution in DFR Cases, and the Remedy of Restitution of Union Dues is Punitive.

USAPA agrees with the Court that there are no cases that can be found that authorize a remedy of restitution or disgorgement of union dues in the context of a DFR claim. In one case where an employee sought a refund of all of his dues based on his claim that his union breached its duty of fair representation, the court did not reach the remedy issue because it dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Morris v. Local 819, 954 F. Supp. 573 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 169 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1999). Dues restitution has been raised in non-DFR cases, but courts in these cases have found this remedy to be punitive, and therefore, not permitted.

The dues restitution remedy appears most often in cases brought by union nonmembers who challenge their union's explanation or calculation of the non-member

agency fee pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). In these cases, courts have denied restitution of union dues on the grounds that such a remedy is punitive and will interfere in the union's performance of its legally required functions. In Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 875 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989), plaintiffs brought an action against their union to challenge the agency fee charged to non-members in 1985 and 1986. Plaintiffs sought restitution of the fees that were deducted from their wages in those two years.² The Seventh Circuit held that the restitution remedy was "a severely punitive remedy ... not one properly described as restitution at all." *Id.* at 1315. The Ninth Circuit has taken the same view of restitution in *Hudson* cases. Prescott v. County of El Dorado, 177 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) ("In our opinion, the

Seventh Circuit [in *Gilpin*] got it just right when it said that a demand for full restitution was punitive insofar as it sought to deprive the union of fees to which it was, doubtlessly, entitled"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111, reinstated in relevant

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In *Hudson*, the Supreme Court held that "the constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending." *Hudson*, 475 U.S. at 310.

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² Plaintiffs also sought class certification, which was denied because the court found a potentially serious conflict of interest between two types of non-member: first, "the employee who is hostile to unions on political or ideological grounds," and second, "the employee who is happy to be represented by a union but won't pay any more for that representation than he is forced to." Gilpin, 875 F.2d at 1313. The court also held that the "National Right to Work Foundation is not an adequate litigation representative" because the restitution remedy was only consistent with the aims of the first type of employee. Id.

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part, 204 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2000); Wagner v. Professional Engineers, 354 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "the proper remedy for a defective [Hudson] notice is issuance of a proper notice with a renewed opportunity for objection).

VI. **Punitive Damages Are Not Permitted in DFR Cases.**

Because general labor policy disfavors punishment, and the adverse consequences of punitive damages awards could be substantial, the Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may not be assessed against a union that breaches its duty of fair representation. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). The court was concerned that punitive damage awards could:

...deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as collective-bargaining agents. Inflicting this risk on employees, whose welfare depends upon the strength of their union, is simply too great a price for whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have.

Id. at 50-51.

Based on the *Hudson* cases discussed above, USAPA submits that plaintiffs' claim for dues restitution in this case is a request for punitive damages, which is a remedy to which plaintiffs are not entitled in this case.

³ A number of Circuits have interpreted *Foust* as stating a *per se* rule against punitive damages in all DFR actions. See Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 759 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Local Union No. 100, 750 F.2d 1368, 1382 (7th Cir. 1984); Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981); Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980).

CONCLUSION

Dismissal of plaintiffs' dues restitution claim is warranted on four grounds. First, plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege such a claim, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Second, plaintiffs are not entitled to what they have characterized as injunctive relief. Third, plaintiffs cannot cite any legal authority supporting their claim for restitution of dues in this DFR case, and neither this Court nor USAPA has found any such authority. Fourth, USAPA submits that plaintiffs' claim for restitution of dues is punitive, and is not permitted under the Supreme Court's ruling in *Foust*.

Pursuant to Rule 12(c), plaintiffs' claim for restitution of dues should be dismissed as a matter of law.

1 Respectfully Submitted, 2 Dated: March 20, 2009 By: /s/ Stanley J. Silverstone 3 Lee Seham, Esq. (pro hac vice) 4 lseham@ssmplaw.com Stanley J. Silverstone, Esq. (pro hac vice) 5 ssilverstone@ssmplaw.com Lucas K. Middlebrook, Esq. (pro hac vice) 6 lmiddlebrook@ssmplaw.com SEHAM, SEHAM, MELTZ & PETERSEN, LLP 7 445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 1204 White Plains, NY 10601 8 Tel: (914) 997-1346; Fax: (914) 997-7125 9 Nicholas P. Granath, Esq. (pro hac vice) 10 ngranath@ssmplaw.com SEHAM, SEHAM, MELTZ & PETERSEN, LLP 11 2915 Wayzata Blvd. Minneapolis, MN 55405 12 Tel 612 341-9080; Fax: 612 341-9079 13 James K. Brengle, Esq. (pro hac vice) DUANE MORRIS, LLP 14 30 South 17th Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196 15 Stanley Lubin, Esq. State Bar No. 003076 16 stan@lubinandenoch.com 17 LUBIN & ENOCH, PC 349 North 4th Avenue 18 Phoenix, AZ 85003-1505 Tel: 602 234-0008; Fax: 602 626 3586 19 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT USAPA 20 21 22 23

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 This is to certify that on the date indicated herein below a true and accurate copy 3 of the foregoing pleading, to wit, Defendant USAPA'S Notice of Motion, Motion, and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Dues Restitution Claim; 4 • Certificate of Service 5 were electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following: 6 7 Marty Harper Andrew S. Jacob Kelly J. Flood mharper@stklaw.com kflood@stklaw.com ajacob@stklaw.com 8 Polsinelli Shughart, P.C. 9 Security Title Plaza, Suite 1200 Phoenix, AZ 85012 10 Tel. 602 650-2000 Fax. 602 264-7033 11 12 Who are admitted counsel for the Plaintiffs in this matter, and 13 Robert A. Siegel Rachel S. Janger rsiegel@omm.com rjanger@omm.com 14 O'Melveny & Meyers LLP 15 400 S. Hope St. Ste 177 16 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899, and, 17 Sarah A. Asta Karen Gillen 18 Sarah.Asta@USAirways.com Karen.gillen@USAirways.com 19

Who are admitted counsel for Defendant US Airways, Inc. in this matter.

And further that paper hard copies were provided to The Honorable Neil V. Wake, District Court Judge, 401 W. Washington Street, SPC 52, Phoenix, AZ 85003.

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1 On March 20, 2009, by: 2 /s/ Stanley J. Silverstone Lee Seham, Esq. (pro hac vice) 3 ssmpls@aol.com Lucas K. Middlebrook, Esq. (pro hac vice) 4 lmiddlebrook@ssmplaw.com Stanley J. Silverstone, Esq. (pro hac vice) 5 ssilverstone@ssmplaw.com SEHAM, SEHAM, MELTZ & PETERSEN, LLP 6 445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 1204 White Plains, NY 10601 7 Tel: (914) 997-1346 8 Fax: (914) 997-7125 9 Nicholas Paul Granath (pro hac vice) ngranath@ssmplaw.com 10 SEHAM, SEHAM, MELTZ & PETERSEN, LLP 2915 Wayzata Blvd. 11 Minneapolis, MN 55405 Tel. 612 341-9080 12 Fax. 612 341-9079 13 James K. Brengle, Esq. (pro hac vice) DUANE MORRIS, LLP 14 30 South 17th Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196 15 16 Stanley Lubin, Esq., Lic. 003076 stan@lubinandenoch.com 17 LUBIN & ENOCH, PC 349 North 4th Avenue 18 Phoenix, AZ 85003-1505 Tel: 602 234-0008 19 Fax: 602 626 3586 20 Attorneys for Defendant: US Airline Pilots Association ("USAPA") 21 22 23